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A NEWSPAPER'S RISKS IN
REPORTING "FACTS" FROM
PRESUMABLY RELIABLE SOURCES:
A STUDY IN THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION
OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
HuGHa MooR, JR.:
I.
The right of privacy has come of age. Finally, 79 years after
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published their famous
article in the HARVAmD LAW REvEw 1 , most commentators and
about two-thirds of the states recognize its existence. But agree-
ment is difficult to come by in the matter of definition.
An individual does not, as some would contend, have a right to
be left alone. As so many students of journalism have learned,
people make the news, and involvement in a newsworthy event
makes anyone's name - and possibly his photograph - available
for publication.
This study is not concerned with all facets of the right of pri-
vacy, but only as it pertains to the news media, and in particular,
newspapers and news magazines. For our purposes the right
of privacy can best be defined as the right of a person to be free
fromneedless embarrassment or harassment through publication
of his name, photograph or details of his personal life in a non-
newsworthy context.
Many right of privacy cases deal with the publication of false
or only partially true information. In this study the only issues
to be discussed are those concerned with the publication of true
material.
II.
A newspaper's reputation often rests on its ability to print the
truth. No publication could continue to stay in business if it fed
the reader a steady diet of false information. For these reasons,
* B.A., Vanderbilt University; LL.B., Yale University Law School; formerly
associated with Chattanooga News-Free Press, Chattanooga Post, New Haven
Register, New Haven Journal-Courier; past editor, Vanderbilt Hustler, Yale
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1. Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HAav. L. Rzv. 193
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editors and publishers rarely question the existence and efficacy
of the tort remedy of defamation. The scope of defamation has
long been a matter of conflict, as recent cases so vividly illus-
trate,2 but few would contend that those who publish false and
damaging information should not be punished. But the right of
privacy is not so easily accepted.
The first amendment to the Constitution guarantees the free-
dom of the press. Publishers have long interpreted this to mean
freedom to print the truth, or, as one large daily proclaims from
its masthead, "To Print the News Impartially, Without Fear or
Favor."3 Truth provides an absolute defense to a charge of def-
amation, and for years newspaper men proceeded under the as-
sumption that if it was true, they could print it. The right of
privacy has changed these assumptions.
Truth does not provide a defense to a charge of violation of
one's right of privacy. Different definitional elements come into
play, such as newsworthiness and the personal status of the com-
plainant. For these and other reasons, the right of privacy is an
unusually difficult area for newspapers.
The conflict of basic freedoms here - freedom of the press and
freedom of the individual - make it imperative that some legal
guidelines be established. There is a natural chilling effect on
the media when they learn that they must print the truth - but
not all of it.
In any discussion of the right of privacy as it relates to the
news media, accommodation must be made for the everyday prac-
ticalitics of the publishing business, including sources for news,
physical facilities and ever-present deadlines. It is in relation to
these practicalities that the definition of truth must be studied.
Truth as the layman sees it is only one thing - the facts. But
there are three distinct categories of news and news articles
which editors believe in good faith to be true. A brief look at
these different kinds of truth may make it easier to discuss the
risks these publications run when they print "true" material.
A first category includes that which is factual, accurate, exact,
a recounting of what happened. Examples include a story about
2. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
3. This motto runs daily and Sunday on the front page of The Chattanooga
Times, a morning newspaper published in Chattanooga, Tennessee, by the Ochs
family, which also controls The New York Times.
[Vol. 2
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a football game or parade by someone who was a witness to the
event, and accounts of legislative or electoral votes. There is no
room for doubt or discussion, since what is written is what act-
ually transpired, that and nothing more.
A second area is closely related to the first. This includes true
and accurate recountings of inaccurate statements provided by
news sources. This would occur when a recognized and widely
accepted news source, such as the police blotter or court records,
provides a reporter with factually incorrect information, which
the newspaper then prints. In these cases, there may be no prac-
tical way in which such an incorrect report could be checked.
A third area in which the truth and the facts do not seem to
coincide covers the accurate recounting of defamatory and/or
untrue statements, such as might occur in a legislative hearing or
a speech. Here, the publisher may know to a certainty that the
charges or facts in question are not true, yet his account is factual
in that it recounts exactly what transpired.
As was hinted at earlier, these categories take on special mean-
ing when they are considered in light of the manner in which
newspapers and news magazines are published. An editor's pri-
mary concern is that the individual story is factual from the
source. Few newspapers would expect a reporter to independently
verify information obtained from court records. Such verifica-
tion would be time-consuming and virtually impossible in many
cases. Errors from usually reliable sources should not be charged
to the newspapers. The press of the deadlines and the duty to
keep the public informed make it imperative that such instances
be considered the publishing of truth for the purposes of taking
them out of the reach of defamation law and putting them with-
in the ambit only of the right of privacy.
The third category - the accurate reporting of false or de-
famatory statements - should also be covered under the area of
true material. The newspapers have a duty, or at least an obliga-
tion, to print accounts of newsworthy events. A newsworthy, al-
beit defamatory speech should receive the same treatment as any
other news event, with the remedy to anyone allegedly injured
lying only under the law of privacy.
The legal definition of truth as it now stands is both simple
and workable. But it is not all-inclusive. The removal of these
cases from the scope of defamation to that of privacy law would
1970]
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provide for a more orderly development of both torts, while at
the same time allowing newspaper editors and publishers to de-
termine their liability for their material on a more certain basis.
Some cases have upheld the rights of newspapers to publish
material which would be included in these additions to the defini-
tion of truth.
A recent Delaware case supported the right of a newspaper to
print information provided it by a recognized source and to re-
main immune from judgment if the information proved to be in-
correct.4 The Wilmington News-Journal had been given informa-
tion by a local Internal Revenue Service official concerning the
government's seizure of a person's property to satisfy a tax judg-
ment. In addition to being a regular news source for the paper,
the I.R.S. employee was charged as a part of his official duties
with supplying newspapers with pertinent information. He pro-
vided the News-Journal with an incorrect name. The records at
the I.R.S. office also listed the name incorrectly. The Delaware
Supreme Court upheld the right of the newspaper to publish the
story. No evidence of any malice or abuse of the paper's privilege
was found.
The Detroit News won a similar case in which a county sheriff
gave a reporter the correct name - but wrong address and iden-
tification - for a criminal suspect. The court said that plaintiff
could prevail only by proving malice.5
There are many cases involving the publication of allegedly
libelous material contained in a speech or interview. In one old
case, for example, Buckstaff v. Hicks,6 the court upheld a $500
libel judgment against the Oshkosh Northwestern which had
published an account of a city council meeting during which a
state senator had been charged with being drunk "four-fifths of
the time." The senator sued. The court noted:
Now, conceding that such remarks made in good faith
were privileged, the privilege did not extend to their
publication to the world.... The publication is exces-
sive. It must be confined to people to whom the defend-
ant owes a duty to speak, or who have an interest with
the defendant in the subject matter.7
4. Short v. News-Journal Co., 212 A.2d 718 (Del. 1965).
5. Sherwood v. Evening News Ass'n., 256 Mich. 318, 239 N.W. 305 (1931).
6. 94 Wis. 34, 68 N.W. 403 (1896).
7. Id. at 40-41, 68 N.W. at 405.
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However, more recent cases have tended to favor the newspa-
pers. In Rhodes v. Star-Herald Printing Co.,8 the court upheld a
lower court dismissal of a $998,000 libel suit filed against the
Scottsbluff (Neb.) Star-Herald for a news story which dealt with
a police search for a missing lawyer. The allegedly libelous matter
was contained in an interview with the sheriff who was heading
up the search. In ruling on the newspaper's use of this interview
the court said, "Such a statement recites facts which the public
is entitled to know and falls within the rule of qualified privilege
that protects a newspaper in the dissemination of news." 9
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals similarly refused
to impose rigid standards of verification on newspapers in Wash-
ington Post v. Keogh.10 The material in question was a column
by Drew Pearson. Plaintiff claimed that mere reliance on Pear-
son's accuracy was grossly negligent. The court took note of the
exigencies of the newspaper business and said that a publication
would have to check such material as the Pearson column only
where there was good reason to suspect falsity. They found no
such reason in the column concerning United States Congressman
Keogh.
These cases should add weight to the suggestion that the defi-
nition of truth should be broadened from its present legal mean-
ing to one which would allow courts and juries to weigh truth as
the newsman sees it, thereby making professional consideration
relevant. Such is frequently the case in medical malpractice suits
involving physicians as defendants.
•III.
Once truth has been adequately defined, the next step is to de-
termine what risks the newspaper takes in publishing true ma-
terial. In making decisions in this area, newspaper editors and
publishers have long been forced to rely on little but their own
good judgment - and faced the prospect of paying out heavy
damages if their judgment did not coincide with that of the judge
or jury.
With respect to the right of privacy the editor is forced to
make two basic decisions on each story: Is the story newsworthy
8. 173 Neb. 496, 113 N.W2d 658 (1962).
9. Id. at 500, 113 N.W.2d at 661. Cf. Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J.
320, 153 A.2d 36 (1959), and Hartley v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 134
N.J.L. 217, 46 A.2d 777 (Ct Err. & App. 1946).
10. 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1970]
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and therefore a matter of public rather than private concern?
To what degree of privacy is the particular individual involved
in this story entitled? The answers to these questions are inter-
dependent. That is, since people are entitled to varying degrees
of privacy according to their position and previous activities,
events which would be newsworthy when involving a public fig-
ure would not be newsworthy at all when a private citizen was
involved.
There are few federal cases in this area of the law. Results and
rationales differ widely from state to state. Hopefully some com-
mon points can be found in the cases, and some common prin-
ciples by which conduct can be ordered will be evolved. Probably
the most troublesome concept is that of newsworthiness.
IV.
Webster's Dictionary defines news very simply as "New infor-
mation about anything; information previously unknown .. .
recent happenings, especially those broadcast over the radio,
printed in a newspaper, etc."'1 A simple definition - but in
examining newspaper conduct, so circular as to be almost useless.
If news is what is printed in a newspaper, then the fact of print-
ing would transform any event - no matter how private or per-
sonal it may be - into news. Plaintiffs would be offered no pro-
tection by such a rule.
Courts have found it no easy task to set forth a workable defi-
nition for news. In Jenkins v. Dell Publishing 0o.,12 the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit attempted at some length to de-
fine the scope of news as it relates to a magazine or newspaper.
The suit involved a story in one of Dell's detective magazines con-
cerning a man who had been stomped to death by a gang of teen-
age hoodlums. The magazine article included photographs of the
deceased's family. The family sued for invasion of privacy, cit-
ing the story itself and the family photograph in particular.
The court defined news as ". . . relatively current events such
as in common experience are likely to be of public interest....
[I]nformation and entertainment are not mutually exclusive
categories." The court went on to point out that "Few newspa-
pers or news magazines would long survive if they did not pub-
11. Wnmsm.'s NEw WoRLD DICTIONARY OF THE AmERCAN LANGUAGE 988
(college ed. 1959).
12. 251 F.2d 447 (3rd Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 22
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lish a substantial amount of news on the basis of entertainment
value of one kind or another." Cited as examples of news with
"entertainment value" were such items as ".... shocking news...
sex in the news.., news which has an incongruous or ironic as-
pect." The court concluded that ". . . once the character or an
item as news is established, it is neither feasible nor desirable for
a court to make a distinction between news for information and
news for entertainment in determining the extent to which a pub-
lication is privileged."13
The Jenkins court seemed unable to draw any line between
what it termed news for information and news for entertainment.
This is a potentially important distinction, since although any
item not previously seen is new to a reader, some are obviously
more important - of greater news value - than others. For
example, the detonation of the first Red Chinese hydrogen bomb
and the fact that an elderly couple feed squirrels on the green
every day may both be new to the reader, but few would argue
that they are of equal importance. One item contains more news
value, the other more entertainment value. On any given day,
botk items may be on the front page of the newspaper - yet they
are as different as two stories could be.
The news-feature distinction is a troublesome one and it seemed
to bother the Supreme Court in the recent Time, Inc. v. Hill
case.14 It is made more difficult by the fact that rarely - if
ever - can a publication-claim to have a homogeneous readership.
Whether taken on a local or national level it is clear that in any
readership sample a significant percentage of the people will be
more concerned with the marital exploits of various Hollywood
stars than with the day-to-day proceedings of the United States
Senate.
Newspapers and magazines are not published solely for the
purpose of dissemination of news - they are profit-making
enterprises of the private sector. This is not intended as a pane-
gyric to private business; in fact it might be more fair to all con-
cened if newspapers and magazines were published by the gov-
ernment. However, ideal performance cannot be expected from
what is by its very nature a mass publication.
A federal district court in Minneapolis recognized this consid-
eration in Berg v. Minneapolis Star & TTbune Co.1' In Berg
13. Id. at 451.
14. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
15. 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948).
1970]
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the Minneapolis paper gave extensive play to a rather sordid
divorce case and in particular to the child custody issues. The
newspaper took a photograph of plaintiff and the child involved
during a courtroom recess. In the suit plaintiff claimed only an
invasion of his right of privacy through publication of the photo-
graph.
The court discussed at some length the fact that divorce cases
are of interest to a substantial number of people and stated that
when confronted with stories ".... attaching importance in the
news to trivial things and sheer gossip regarding the intimate de-
tails of the lives of important and near-important people ... the
courts should not attempt to determine whether the Press is to
blame or whether it is merely catering to the present mores of the
people."' 0 The photograph and story in Berg were held to be
legitimate news.
However, concern with the trivial and sensational is not always
accepted as news. In Perry v. Hearst Corporation,17 the court of
appeals vacated a district court judgment dismissing a libel
charge against the publisher of a Boston newspaper. The appeals
panel suggested that malice could be proved merely from the
manner in which the story in question was written, without any
showing of personal animus directed -at the plaintiff as an in-
dividual. The story in question concerned the exhumation of the
bodies of two former husbands of a Boston area woman and in-
cluded several details of her rather checkered personal life. For
the most part, the individual, often trivial details of the story
were true. Slight inaccuracies of fact were not considered ma-
terial by the court.
The court noted first that Massachusetts law established that
truth is no defense to a publication made with actual malice,18
and went on to say: "Taking the article as a whole we believe it
would be only natural for even reasonable readers to assume that
they were being furnished with something more than necrology,
or trivia concerning the relict of a routinely posted cadaver, and
that they could well conclude that the plaintiff was suspected of
having engaged in highly sinister conduct." 19
The Perry case at least provides some outer limit beyond which
news publications cannot go. Factual material may be presented
16. Id. at 962.
17. 334 F2d 800 (1st Cir. 1964).
18. IMAss. Arm. LAws ch. 231, § 92 (1956).
19. 334 F.2d at 802.
[Vol. 22
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in such a slanted and sensational manner so as to make the facts
belie their own -existence. Such distortion of the facts will re-
move a story from an area under which it would be judged only
under privacy standards to one covered by the laws of libel and
defamation.
It is possible that the courts will at some time in the future
choose to make some distinction between news and feature ma-
terial based on deadline and' time considerations, even if no de-
lineation is drawn between entertainment and information for
the purposes of defining news.
The headwayor lead time on a news story - the time between
the occurrence or discovery of an event and the deadline for its
necessary publication - is often only a matter of minutes. The
news media - newspapers, radio and television stations and
newsmagazines - are extremely competitive. There is no time to
check and recheck sources on news stories. The practicalities of
the business prevent it. If the source is reliable, the reporter is
accurate and the story is of a news rather than feature nature, it
should be considered true.
However, in the case of feature material and some exclusive
(i.e., non-competitive) news stories, the lead time is sufficient
to preclude the acceptance of incorrect data as the truth.
Courts may also consider that news for entertainment is not
provided as much first amendment protection as news for infor-
mation. It is difficult to imagine that the intent of Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison and others who helped draft the Bill
of Rights was to protect the type of material which appears
constantly in the detective, motion picture and other pulp maga-
zines.
Still, it has rarely been argued that value judgments should
play any role in the implementation of Constitutional rights. The
judges in the Berg and Jenkins cases were probably right in their
conclusion that the entertainment-information distinction was
not a valid one for them to make.
News involving criminal activities seems to fall somewhere be-
tween the two categories. Certainly there is an informational as-
pect to such data, but it cannot be gainsaid that a primary reason
that criminal activities are reported in such detail in many pub-
lications is that a substantial number of people find such infor-
mation titillating. The detective magazines have built a multi-
19701
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million dollar business out of publicizing in as lurid a manner as
possible murders, rapes and assaults which may have happened
as many as 25 years ago. Even such respected newspapers as The
New York Daily News built their circulations through extensive
coverage, both in words and pictures, of major criminal cases.
Courts, however, have long taken a dim view of criminals or
criminal suspects who file suits against the media, charging either
defamation or invasion of their right of privacy. Two reasons
seem likely.
One is that most matters concerning criminal activities become
matters of public record as soon as a suspect has been arrested.
Although for roughly 75 years private individuals have been
litigating with newspapers in an effort to keep some matter of
public record private, it is almost universally accepted now that
the news media have the right to print such data. In few other
areas of news is there such full public disclosure. Between the
booking, preliminary hearing, trial and any past criminal record,
there is little about a person which can remain private.
A second reason for the courts' hesitancy to hold for the plain-
tiff in such suits is that the criminal or criminal suspect has for-
feited a portion of his right of privacy through his wrongdoing.
In a moralistic sense, they do not believe that such a plaintiff de-
serves any consideration from the legal system which he has
flouted. A Washington court said substantially this in the old
case of Hodgemam v. OZsen.20 Here a prisoner objected to the
state's distributing his photograph, taken upon his admission to
the prison. The court noted that the state could not maliciously
distribute the photographs with intent to injure the plaintiff, but
it added: "[Tihe relation to the public of one who has been
convicted of crime is such as to forfeit whatever right of privacy
he may be said to have ever possessed. This is true at least to the
extent that the protection of society requires such forefeiture. 21
Involvement, even peripherally, in criminal activities may
bring on a great deal of humiliation, embarrassment and loss of
privacy, but courts have long been prone to find that public dis-
closure of such activities was more important than the individual
privacy involved.
A complicated case involving such issues was Beyl v. Capper
PubZications.22 The Topeka Daily Capital published a story con-
20. 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
21. Id. at 624, 150 P. at 1126.
22. 180 Kan. 525, 305 P.2d 817 (1957).
[Vol. 2
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cerning the breaking of a large, multi-state grain theft ring. In-
cluded was an interview with the state's attorney general and an
old police photograph of the prime suspect. The photograph had
been taken several years earlier when the suspect was involved in
a very minor offense. The plaintiff objected to certain statements
made by the attorney general, and to the use of the photograph.
He was later convicted on charges arising out of the theft scheme.
The court said:
The rule is well established that it is within the qualified
privilege of a newspaper to publish in good faith as cur-
rent news all matters involving open violations of law
which justify police interference, and matters in con-
nection with and in aid of the prosecution of inquiries
regarding the commission of crime, even though the pub-
lication may reflect on the individuals concerned and
tend to bring them into public disgrace.
23
At least one court has gone further than the Beyl case, stating
that the public has a right to be informed about all phases of
police activities. In O'Neal v. Tribune Company 24 the court af-
firmed a $2,000 judgment for a nursery school operator (the
plaintiff, victorious in the trial, appealed, asserting a grossly in-
adequate verdict) who claimed she had been damaged by sensa-
tionalized stories appearing in the Tampa Times and Tampa Tri-
bune. The Florida court said the public has a "right" to be in-
formed as to "... open violations of law or public misconduct
which justifies police interference, and matters in connection with
and in aid of the prosecution of inquiries regarding the commis-
sion of a crime .... "25
There is one comparatively minor area in which some states
have made the legislative judgment that although certain data
concerned with criminal misconduct may indeed be newsworthy,
it will be illegal to publish it. This is the identification of rape
victims.
Four states have statutes prohibiting the publication of the
names of rape victims - Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and
Wisconsin. 26 Cases involving these statutes are rare, most likely
23. Id. at 526-27, 305 P.2d at 819.
24. 176 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1965).
25. Id. at 547. The verdict against the newspaper was sustained because the
stories "did not conform to the important requirements of fairness and accu-
racy." Id. at 549.
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2105 (1953);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-81 (1962) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (1958).
1970]
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because newspapers and other media in the states involved tend to
obey the law voluntarily. However, when a close case in South
Carolina reached the courts recently, the court ruled against the
rape victim. The court was willing to accept a violation of the
spirit if not the letter of the statute, possibly because of the tra-
ditional reluctance of courts to agree to the suppression of any
news connected with a crime.
The case, Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co.,27
involved two young women who travelled around to various
South Carolina schools for the State Health Department, present-
ing a puppet show extolling the virtues of regular dental care.
The women were widely kmown as the "Little Jack Girls," after
the name of their puppet. A Florence, S. C., television station
broadcast film of the girls' station wagon - with "Little Jack
Girls" printed prominently on its side - and commented in the
newscast that it was the vehicle in which the rape victims were
riding. The court said: "[T]he defendants have not identified
the plaintiffs sufficiently in the allegations of the complaint to
allege a cause of action for damages for the violation of their
right of privacy." 28
Many newspapers withhold such information voluntarily in
order to prevent such victims from being needlessly embarrassed.
There appear to be no cases in the 46 states without such statutes
in which a rape victim has prosecuted an invasion of privacy suit
against a newspaper or any other news media.
Probably the most difficult problem in defining newsworthi-
ness is the determination of the length of time for which any
given item will be considered news. After a certain period of
time some items-automobile accidents, for example-must drop
from the category of news into another even less well-defined
category.
As a hypothetical example, consider the following situation:
During the early 1930's a young man becomes involved in a rum-
running ring on the Florida east coast. He, along with the others
in the scheme, is apprehended. After a lengthy trial in which
many sordid details, both of the plot and of the personal lives of
those involved, are revealed, the young man is convicted. After
serving a five-year term in federal prison, he is released. He
moves to Denver, starts a small dry cleaning business, and after
27. 213 F. Supp. 174 (E.D.S.C. 1963).
28. Id. at 176.
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss1/3
A Nhwsp&pm's RIsKs
25 years completely remakes his life. No one in Denver knows
about his prison record, and he is elected president of the Cham-
ber of Commerce and a deacon in his church. Unfortunately, he
becomes involved in a minor traffic accident and a new reporter
for a local newspaper, recognizing the man's name, dredges up
the stories on his past and publishes the damaging information as
an addendum to a brief story on the wreck. Has the man's pri-
vacy been violated?
The question has no easy answer. Initially, it must be pointed
out that all the relevant information is a matter of public record.
In theory, any citizen could discover for himself all that the
newspaper published. Nothing was manufactured or obtained
from personal sources.
The material would also meet any standards of public interest.
There is no doubt that a great number of people, indeed, almost
every reader of the newspaper, would find the news of this man's
past interesting and, to some degree, entertaining. And, although
in fact a rehash of facts which had all been previously published,
it would be news - in any sense of the word - to the people in
Denver.
The only way that our putative plaintiff would seem to be able
to win his case in court would be if the court decided to make a
value judgement on the worth of certain news, i.e., that no valid
Constitutional purpose was served by allowing these details to be
published. But courts have traditionally shied away from such
determi'ations2 9 and there is no indication that the decision
would be any different here.
Two recent cases have presented this question of the lapse of
time and news value, and both were decided in favor of the news-
papers.
In BeZ v. Courier-JournaZ and Louisville Times Company, 0
the police judge of Bedford, Ky., brought suit against the Louis-
ville papers over a story which the Courier-Journal had printed
about his efforts to reduce traffic charges and collect fines im-
mediately rather than go through the procedure of a jury trial.
At the end of the story the reporter had added that the judge
was, according to tax records, behind in payment of his property
tax. Judge Bell alleged that the inclusion of the tax matter was
29. See Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948), and Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3rd Cir. 1958).
30. 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1966).
1970]
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malicious and an "unlawful invasion of his right of privacy." The
court noted that truth was no defense to an allegation of invasion
of privacy, but added that the republishing of a matter of public
record was not "an actionable invasion of the right of privacy."3 1
The tax matter here predated the traffic court squabble and
clearly had no connection at all with it. In its decision the court
decided to approach the case only through the public records is-
sue. No discussion was devoted to whether the tax data was of
and by itself newsworthy. Also important in this case was the
fact that Bell was a public official and criticism of and comment
upon his actions was thought by the court to be covered under
Nrew York Times Oo. v. Sullivan.
3 2
However, in Barbieri v. News-Jounal Company 33 the Dela-
ware court did consider the newsworthiness issue. Barbeiri had
been the last person in the state to undergo lashing as a criminal
penalty when the United States Supreme Court decided to hear a
case challenging the punishment as unconstitutional. The Wil-
mington Morning News published a story concerning the suit, and
added that Barbieri had been the last to "feel the lash." He sued
for invasion of privacy, claiming that both he and his family had
been injured by the article. The story appeared nine years after
the lashing, and in the interim he had married, raised a family
and, as the court said, "led an exemplary life."
The court upheld the newspaper's right to publish the informa-
tion and said: "But we do not agree that the lapse of time, in it-
self, recreates, or reinstates, a plaintiff's prior right of privacy,
because the right of the press to republish the unpleasant facts
still exists if those facts are 'newsworthy', i.e., if they still are of
legitimate public concern.
2s 4
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did at one time-
albeit briefly - attempt to place a time limit on newsworthiness.
In Wagner v. Fawcett PbTlications,"5 Mrs. Wagner brought suit
against the defendant magazine publishers who had published a
rather sensationalized article about her daughter's murder. The
court of appeals upheld the lower court at first, holding that the
lapse of a few months time had made the story no longer current,
and thus no longer newsworthy. However, the court soon with-
31. Id. at 88.
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963).
34. Id. at 775.
35. 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962).
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drew its first opinion and substituted a second, in which it held
for Fawcett.30 In its revised opinion the court noted that the case
was still on appeal, and therefore still current.
In an earlier federal court case, Leverton v. Curtis Publishing
Co.,
3 7 the third circuit faced this same problem, and attempted to
take a middle course. A $5,000 plaintiff's judgment was ap-
proved in Leverton, which involved the use by The Saturday
Evening Post of a photograph taken some 20 months prior to the
Post's publication. The picture, of a young girl who had just
been struck by an automobile, was taken in Birmingham, Ala.,
and received nationwide circulation at the time through Associ-
ated Press. Post used the photograph to illustrate a story on care-
less pedestrians who are injured through their own fault. There
was no indication that the Leverton girl had been at fault when
she was injured.
The court was careful not to hold that mere lapse of time would
make a once-newsworthy event un-newsworthy. Citing the Re-
statement of Torts, § 867, for the proposition that one who is the
subject of a striking catastrophe is the object of legitimate public
interest, the court went on:
It could be easily agreed that the plaintiff in this case,
because she was once involved in an automobile accident
does not continue throughout her life to have her goings
and comings made the subject of newspaper stories.
That, however, is a long way from saying that the oc-
casion of her once becoming a subject of public interest
cannot be brought again to public interest later on....
[T]his particular plaintiff, the legitimate subject for
publicity for one particular accident, now becomes a pic-
torial, frightful example of pedestrian carelessness.
This, we think, exceeds the bounds of privilege.
38
It appears, therefore, virtually impossible to draw any sort of
a line in time which will adequately separate the newsworthy
from the non-newsworthy. The problem may best be covered by
basing decisions in the area on the newsworthiness of the individ-
ual rather than on the incident itself.
36. See Comment, The Right of Privacy: Norinative-Descriptive Confusion
in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 722 at 726-27 (1963).
37. 192 F.2d 974 (3rd Cir. 1951).
38. Id. at 977-78.
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The use of material found in public records8 9 has long been a
matter for discussion in the courts. Newspapers resort to public
records every day as sources for articles. Hospital reports, voter
registration lists, and the day-to-day records of a multitude of
other governmental agencies are literal necessities for adequate
news coverage of any locality.
The argument in favor of allowing the news media unfettered
use of public records is a compelling one. In theory any person
could go to the place at which the records are kept and see the
material for himself.40 Since most people have neither the time
nor inclination to visit the police station each morning to check on
the arrests from the previous night, why should not the news
media be able to publish this data for the convenience of every-
one?
Opponents of unregulated publication of public records con-
tend that the standard should be one of news value, not news
availability. It is no justification for publication, it is argued,
that an item is available to representatives of the newspaper.
Early cases, including one memorable opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes,41 refused newspapers the right to publish all public rec-
ords and remain immune from liability. To cite one example, in
I1sley v. Sentinal Co.,42 the court said, "There is, however, no
right in the public to know that A charges B with unworthy or
criminal conduct, even in court, as a fact by itself; that is mere
gossip or scandal."
43
In more recent decisions courts almost invariably allow the
publication of matter taken from public records.44 The Illinois
Supreme Court overturned a $150,000 judgment which a restau-
rant owner had obtained against a Peoria newspaper in Lulay v.
PeorMa Journal-Star, Inc.45 The plaintiff claimed damage from
39. See Bell v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., su!pra note 30 and
accompanying text.
40. In actual practice, employees in charge of public records may be ex-
tremely reluctant to allow anyone not "authorized," i.e., newsmen and public
officials, to inspect the records. Also, the average citizen would not have the
slightest idea where such records might be found.
41. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884).
42. 133 Wis. 20, 113 N.W. 425 (1907).
43. Id. at 25, 113 N.W. at 426. Cf. Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.,
318 Mass. 156, 61 N.E.2d 5 (1945) ; Kimball v. Post Publishing Co., 199 Mass.
248, 85 N.E. 103 (1908) ; Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 112
N.W. 258 (1907).
44. Cf. Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 112, 214 N.E.2d 746
(1966) ; Lybrand v. The State Co., 179 S.C. 208, 184 S.E. 580 (1936).
45. 34 Ill. 2d 112, 214 N.E.2d 746 (1966).
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an article in the Journal-Star which told of his efforts, finally
successful, to obtain a health license after many violations. The
court said: "The right to speak and print about such actions of
government is well established; denial of this right would be a
serious infringement on both State and Federal constitutional
guarantees for free speech and press."4 6
Although the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press
would seem to require that the news media be permitted to pub-
lish any and all items of public record without possible tort lia-
bility, considerations which become relevant in a discussion of
who should have a right of privacy may override some of the
Constitutional aspects of the problem. For example, all factual
data in adoption proceedings are usually a matter of public rec-
ord. However, such material is frequently of a highly personal
nature, and public disclosure in the press should be considered in
most cases a tortious invasion of the individual's privacy.
V.
The second of the two mutually dependent questions which a
publisher must ponder when making a decision in the privacy
area is, to what degree of privacy is the particular individual in-
volved in this story entitled? The determination of the news-
worthiness of any given event cannot be made in a vacuum. The
fact of a person's birth or death may or may not be newsworthy.
As a way of illustration and introduction to this area, birth
and death provide useful examples. The ordinary birth of a baby
is not in itself considered a newsworthy event. It happens every
day. However, this same event, when it happens to involve a per-
son who is newsworthy, becomes an item of news, e.g., the births
of the children of President and Mrs. Kennedy. A birth can also
become newsworthy because of the facts which surround it - if
it involves quintuplets, or happens on a crowded subway car.
The ordinary death of a person is newsworthy only as a matter
of record. But the death of a General Eisenhower will dominate
the news for several days. If the circumstances of death are un-
usual or violent, the event is newsworthy no matter who is in-
volved. A plunge from the top of the Empire State Building or
the choking to death of a bride on a piece of her wedding cake
would put the names of even the most mundane people in the
news.
46. Id. at 114, 214 N.E.2d at 747-48.
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This area of the personal scope of privacy is much more dif-
ficult than the factual determination of newsworthiness because
of the infinite variety of people and their personalities. Publicity
which would make one person ill from shock and embarrassment
would be found enjoyable by another.
An historical rule in torts law is that one takes his plaintiffs as
they are - the "thin-skull" rule. However, before this principle
comes into operation, some negligence on the part of the alleged
tortfeasor must be shown. An ordinary, non-negligent act by a
reasonably prudent man cannot make that man liable for injury
inadvertantly caused some highly-sensitive person. For instance,
a girl wearing a mini-skirt would not be liable if some high-prin-
cipled member of the D.A.R. fainted in shock upon seeing the girl
so scantily clad.
This same rule applies in the area of invasion of privacy, but it
becomes difficult to apply when the negligence of the publisher
must be established. As earlier examples pointed out, courts have
held that news includes items either interesting or informative,
under very broad definitions of those words. The media arguably
have a first amendment right to publish any item of news. Can
the publishing of such matter ever be negligent? Probably not,
but courts, in affirming plaintiff's judgments, will frequently
hold that the item in question was not newsworthy and avoid the
issue of negligence entirely.
Although courts do not often look to the individual's personal
sensitivity, plaintiffs in privacy cases are usually placed in one of
three broad categories - public officials, public figures, and
everyone else. The basic presumption behind these classifications
is that people whose occupation or outside activities place them
frequently in the public eye should be more accustomed to - and
therefore less bothered by - publicity.
The Supreme Court has made use of these distinctions in the
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts47 cases, both of which involved not privacy, but defamation
and libel. Precise boundaries for the categories are difficult to
determine.
In the New York Times case the Court does not provide a de-
tailed definition of a prublic official, apparently assuming that
none was needed, the term defining itself. Mr. Justice Brennan
47. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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speaks only of judges and other government officials, such as
elected city commissioners.
The Court in its Butts decision, which joined cases concerning
Coach Wally Butts and Gen. Edwin Walker, set out the two ways
in which a person can become included in the public figure classi-
fication. Mr. Justice Harlan notes that Butts, who was head
football coach and athletic director at the University of Georgia,
"may have attained that status by position alone." Harlan is not
willing to go so far with Gen. Walker, who had been a troop com-
mander in West Germany involved in the dissemination of right-
wing political literature to his soliders. He states that Gen.
Walker attained the status "by his purposeful activity amounting
to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an important
public controversy."
48
As a study of several relevant cases will demonstrate, the classi-
fication of individuals and the determination of their personal
rights is not an easy matter, and the courts are far from agree-
ment.
VI.
Any case study of the individual's right to privacy should be-
gin with the now-famous case of Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.49
William James Sidis was the subject of a brief biographical
sketch in Tnm NEw YoRarn magazine. More than 30 years before
the NE w YomuR article was published, Sidis had been a renowned
child prodigy, no doubt a public figure whose activities would
have been newsworthy. In the intervening years, however, Sidis
had made every attempt to drop from public view. As the court
noted, "[Hie has sought to live as unobtrusively as possible."50
Sidis claimed that his right of privacy had been violated by the
article, which although not unfavorable, opened up his life, all his
foibles and eccentricities, to the public. The court held in favor
of the magazine.
48. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 at 155 (1967). Butts had
been charged with conspiring with University of Alabama football coach Paul
"Bear" Bryant to fix an earlier football game between the two schools. The
SATURDAY EVENING PosT had obtained all its information from a source who
claimed to have heard the two coaches plotting the fix through some mix-up
in the telephone system as he was making a call. The Associated Press had
charged in an A-wire release that Gen. Walker had led opposition to the United
States marshals at the University of Mississippi during the school's riots when
James Meredith was first admitted there.
49. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
50. Id. at 807.
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Circuit Judge Clark stated that Sidis was still a public figure,
despite his attempts to the contrary, since people might wonder
whatever became of him. In an extremely lucid and valuable
opinion, Clark attempted to set out a rough privacy standard
which could be applied to public figures:
We express no comment on whether the newsworthi-
ness of the matter printed will always constitute a com-
plete defense. Revelations may be so intimate and so un-
warranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage
the community's notions of decency. But when focused
upon public characters, truthful comments upon dress,
speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality
will usually not transgress this line. Regrettably or not,
the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and "public
figures" are subjects of considerable interest and discus-
sion to the rest of the population. And when such are
the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a
court to bar their expression in the newspapers, books
and magazines of the day.51
The Sidis case is particularly important in the area of privacy,
since at a fairly early point in privacy-news media litigation it
set forth a convincing argument which would make it difficult
for a person included in the public figure category ever to win a
judgment against an offending publication.
In fact, any judgment granting damages for invasion of pri-
vacy is rare. But a search of relevant case material has failed to
discover a single instance in which a public figure has collected
damages from any one of the news media for the publication of
an item or facts which were entirely true.
As was noted in the Jenkins and Berg cases,52 the matter of
taste and sensitivity rarely enters into a court's consideration of
an article. This is particularly true in cases involving public fig-
ures. In Goelet v. Confidential, Ine.,l a sensational divorce case
involving public figures -the court neglected to specify exactly
who in its report - plaintiff claimed that the story in CoNFI-
DwNT AL violated his privacy by overplaying what were essenti-
ally trivial facts. The court said: "[D]etailed reports of the
piquant facts in matrimonial litigation and the colorful escapades
51. Id. at 809.
52. Supra, notes 12 and 15 and accompanying text.
53. 5 App. Div. 2d 226, 171 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1958).
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and didoes of well-known persons.., are part and parcel of the
reading habits of the American public. We cannot undertake to
pass judgment on those reading tastes." 54
The inherent and inescapable circularity of this entire field
was clearly pointed out by a United States district court in Bran-.son v. Fawcett Puhications.55 In Branson the plaintiff was a
race car driver who had been involved in a spectacular collision
three years before the suit was begun. A photograph of the acci-
dent received wide circulation through the news services soon af-
ter it occurred. TRuE CorssioNs magazine used the photograph
with an unrelated story. The court turned down plaintiff's pli-
vacy claim, ruling that he was a public figure, but added this dis-
turbing dictum: "No doubt one who is a public figure, -whether
he seeks the public eye or not, waives the right of privacy to all
newsworthy publications." 58 According to a literal reading of
this statement, public figures have no right of privacy when it
comes to newsworthy material.
But that is the same as no rule at all. If an accurate definition
for newsworthy data can be formulated, then no one would have
a right of privacy as it related to a newsworthy article. And that
would leave public figures and everyone else in the same position.
One does not even need to be a public figure himself in order
to fall within the ambit of the rules courts use for public figures
in privacy litigation.
In Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Ic., 51 the former husband
of movie actress Janet Leigh brought suit against the publishers
of MoTIo, PicTuim magazine after they printed a sensationalized
account of his brief, unhappy marriage to Miss Leigh more than
20 years earlier. The court was not pleased with the content or
style of the story in question, or of others in the magazine. It
noted at one point, "Some cynic has said: 'Widespread literacy
is not an unmixed blessing." '5  In overruling Carlisle's claim
the court noted: "[P]eople closely related to ... public figures in
their activities must also to some extent lose their right to the pri-
vacy that one unconnected with the famous or notorious would
have." 59
54. Id. at 229-30 171 N.Y.S2d at 226.
55. 124 F. Supp.'429 (E.D. Ill. 1954).
56. Id. at 433.
57. 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962).
58. Id. at 736, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
59. Id. at 747, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 415. See also Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne
& Heath, 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1947).
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Two reasons are usually advanced for denying the same degree
of privacy to public officials and public figures that is granted to
everyone else. One is the theory that by dint of his public posi-
tion the public figure has become more inured to publicity and is
less likely to suffer any emotional or physical harm from seeing
his activities reported in the news media. The second is that the
public is more interested in the activities and personal lives of
public figures than ordinary people.
A separate justification is often put forward in the case of
public officials. The public is said to have placed some sort of
trust in these officials, both elected and appointed, and it is
thought that thorough reporting of their activities will better
enable the public to determine how the government is being run,
and if the officials are the type of person to whom such trust
should be given.
In an article in the SouT ERn CALnronNA LAW REvIEW,60
Irwin 0. Spiegel suggests a definition for a celebrity (a term he
uses in place of public figure) which would make no distinction
between public officials and public figures. He would include in
such a category any "person engaged in a public calling."
Other commentators have stated that after the Sidis decision,
the only standard left by which privacy could be determined
would be one of decency. 61 Spiegel agrees with this as far as pub-
lic figures are concerned, but defines decency in specific terms:
In our generation, however, there appears to be uniform
cultural agreement that certain activities are of an in-
herently private nature, particularly those concerning
intimate sexual relationships... If the celebrity stands
in the position of a private citizen when performing
domestic roles in private surroundings, he unquestion-
ably has a right to privacy in those performances of an
intimate sexual nature. 62
Just as courts almost invariably find that criminal activities
are newsworthy, persons convicted of a felony or misdemeanor,
and even those peripherally involved in criminal activities face a
near-impossible task in attempting to convince a court that they
should not be always treated as public figures.
60. Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right To
Privacy, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 280 (1957).
61. See Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal
Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REv. 107 (1963).
62. Spiegel, supra note 60, at 290, 299.
[Vol. 2
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss1/3
A NEwsrApE's Risxs
The Barbieri case 63 held that the passage of time and the ef-
forts of a convicted felon to remove himself from the public fig-
ure category were unavailing. A federal court in South Carolina
dismissed a complaint in privacy filed by a man whose police
"mug shot" had been distributed by the Associated Press, saying
that with the issuance of a warrant and his arrest, he became a
public figure.64
A Connecticut federal district court reached similar conclu-
sions in Hazlitt v. Fawoett Publications,65 which involved a stunt
car driver charged with murder. The court said:
Indeed, even if the plaintiff here were not deemed a
public figure by occupation, his involuntary catapault to
temporary notoriety because of his involvement in a
homocide left him without right to object to fair news
accounts of the homocide and of his arrest and trial and
without right to object to mention of his occupation in
that connection.66
But in Mau v. Rio Grande Oil,T the court found that the
plaintiff, who had been the victim of a robbery, had a cause of
action for invasion of his privacy. Mau claimed that he lost his
job as a chauffer because he became physically agitated after the
C.B.S. radio program "Calling All Cars" broadcast a reinact-
ment of the robbery in which he was involved. The court found
that Mau had a "right to be left alone," and that this right had
been violated by the broadcast.
Mau, who may have become a public figure through his un-
willing participation in the robbery, provides an introduction to
the most difficult question in the area of the scope of personal
privacy: How much privacy does the non-public individual
have?
If the news media are allowed to determine for themselves what
is and what is not newsworthy, very little will be left of individ-
ual privacy. Criminal lawyer Louis Nizer has written that "one's
private life is a precious possession which cannot be wrested from
him."68 Some zone must be defined so that the term "private life"
will continue to have some meaning.
63. Supra, note 33.
64. Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
65. 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953).
66. Id. at 545.
67. 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
68. Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's Developments, 39 MIcH.
L REv. 526 at 560 (1941).
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Barber v. Time, Inw.,09 is a comparatively early case in which
a plaintiff collected money damages for the publication of • an
article which was neither malicious nor defamatory and which
was true in all respects. Unfortunately, courts have not been will-
ing to follow the lead of the Missouri court which, according to
one commentator, "clearly differentiated between the legitimate
news value of the event and the news value of identifying unwill-
ing actors in the event." °70 Barber involved a young woman who
had become stricken with a rare disease which caused her to have
an insatiable appetite. Tnma published the article under a head-
line reading "Starving Glutton," and carried a photograph of
her, made against her wishes while she was in a hospital bed. The
court noted:
Certainly if there is any right of privacy at all, it should
include the right to obtain medical treatment at home or
in a hospital for an individual personal condition (at
least if it is not contagious or dangerous to others) with-
out personal publicity.... While plaintiff's ailment may
have been a matter of some public interest because un-
usual, certainly the identity of the person who suffered
this ailment was not.
71
It is difficult to disagree with this court, but it is also difficult
to carry its reasoning too far. Certainly this woman's name was
not a necessary element of TrE's story. It would have been just
as interesting and newsworthy had it spoken of simply "a young
woman in a St. Louis hospital." But similarly, many minor news
items, published each day in virtually all newspapers, would be
equally newsworthy if the names of the unwilling participants
were omitted.
For example, many stories about minor traffic accidents do not
need to have the names of those involved included. Arrests and
convictions for public drunkenness, drug use, lascivious carriage
and similar offenses may be newsworthy only in that readers are
entertained by reading about the personal sins of others. But
each of these cases would be covered by the privacy doctrine sur-
rounding criminal activities and those involved in them. The
identification of wrongdoers in the news media is thought by
many law enforcement officers to deter the commission of many
69. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
70. Franklin, mipra note 61, at 116.
71. 348 Mo. at 1207, 159 S.W.2d at 295.
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minor offenses.72 Those involved as innocent participants in
such situtations, e.g., the motorist whose automobile is hit by a
drunken driver, should have little about which to complain
since their participation is a matter of public record, and a court
would be hard pressed to find that a plaintiff had suffered any
harm from the disclosure that his automobile was involved in a
collision which was not his fault.
The key distinction which should be drawn is one of embar-
rassment. The news media should not be given a proscriptive
right to embarrass people whose involvement in an activity is not
in itself newsworthy.
A case involving such issues is Daily Times Democrat v.
GrahamT . The plaintiff here, Mrs. Graham, won a $4,166 judg-
ment against a local newspaper which published on its front
page a photograph of her, taken just as she emerged from a
carnival fun house, with her skirt blown up by a blast of air.
The Alabama Supreme Court seemed to take a similar attitude
-toward individual privacy as the Missouri court in Barber. It
stated that the mere fact that an activity or incident is public,
open to view by anyone present, does not mean that a photo-
graph of such activity or incident may be published. It stated
that the photograph in question "Certainly... discloses nothing
to which the public is entitled to be informed," and added: "To
hold that one who is involuntarily and instantaneously en-
meshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of privacy
merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a pub-
lic scene would be illogical, wrong, and unjust."1 74
Mrs. Graham had done absolutely nothing which would en-
title the newspaper to publish her photograph. She had not
been involved in any newsworthy event and had done nothing to
draw attention to herself. She merely happened to be coming
out of the fun house at the same time that a newspaper photog-
rapher decided that it was a propitious time to take a picture
of someone. Mrs. Graham was the someone. Almost any other
72. Conversations with Capt. J. E. Weese and Patrolman Fred Mullins,
Tennessee Highway Patrol, summer 1968, Hamilton County Courthouse, Chat-
tanooga, Tennessee. Both of these law enforcement officers sought out news-
paper reporters frequently to see that stories were published concerning the
disposition of traffic cases. Both Weese, a district commander, and Mullins
considered the publishing of such information an integral portion of their
deterrent law enforcement activities.
73. 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964).
74. Id. at 383, 162 So. 2d at 478.
190o]
25
Moore: A Newspaper's Risk In Reporting "Facts" From Presumably Reliable
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
photograph of the fair would have illustrated the newspaper's
feature story about it as well or better than the one of Mrs.
Graham with her skirt blown up embarrassingly far. There was
no necessity - practical or otherwise - which required the pub-
lication of that particular photograph.
But a federal court in Louisiana ruled in another case,
Mahafey v. Official Detective Stories, Ino.,75 that a magazine's
disclosure of embarrassing and apparently unnecessary infor-
mation was non-actionable. The Mahaffey case involved a story
in one of the ever-present detective magazines about the murder
of plaintiff's son. The son had been murdered in Houston and
his parents resided in Louisiana. None of the parents' friends
knew of the true circumstances of the youth's death, but instead
had been told that he was killed in an automobile accident. The
court admitted that the plaintiffs had been "hurt" by the pub-
lication of the story, but added: "The publication of a news-
worthy event of public interest is privileged. '7 6 Unlike the two
previous cases, the plaintiffs in Mahaffey could not sustain
their cause of action because the court found newsworthiness in
the disclosure of the embarrassing facts.
A recent California case has placed physical limits on privacy,
creating an actual zone in which personal activities may be car-
ried on without interference by the news media. No appeal rec-
ord of the case has been found, but plaintiff obtained a $1,000
judgment in the district court in Dieteman v. Time, Inc."7
Plaintiff was a "physician" operating a reducing clinic in Cali-
fornia. Lurm magazine published an in-depth article on such
clinics, using reporters operating under assumed names and
with concealed cameras for source material. The article was
published before any formal charges had been filed, or any
other legal action had been taken against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff did not allege that the article and accompanying pho-
tograph were inaccurate in any way; he simply asserted a viola-
tion of his right of privacy. The court was unsympathetic with
Dietemann's activities - terming them "simple quackery" -
but upheld the verdict anyway. The court stated: "If one had
a meeting in his house for political or other purposes, unless
such meeting was open to the public it does not follow that the
activities are in the public view, permitting pictures to be taken
75. 210 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. La. 1962).
76. Id. at 253.
77. 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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and published without knowledge and consent. Such a conclu-
sion would completely destroy the right of privacy." 78
In Annerino v. Dell Publishing o.79 the court based its opin-
ion on both grounds, embarrassment and solitude. The case in-
volved an article in IxsmE DEoT concerning the murder of
plaintiff's husband. The publishers had used her photograph
as an illustration. The Illinois court reinstated her cause of ac-
tion and said:
It is further conceded that there are many invasions
of privacy that the courts have decided are lawful and
for which the invaders may not be punished, partic-
ularly where the invasions are justified as a proper ex-
ercise of freedom of the press.... However, this rule
is not a license by which various press media may over-
step the bounds of propriety and decency and thereby
justify an invasion of the solitude of the individual.8 0
The court is saying, then, that when a person is embarrassed, the
offending publication has stepped over into that person's zone
of privacy.
The most recent federal case in this field of privacy, the news
media and the truth is Varnisk v. Best Medium Publishing
Co.81 The appellate court in Varnish sets forth some rules,
which if taken literally, will make it virtually impossible for
plaintiffs to win on a privacy claim in the second circuit, tra-
ditionally the situs of many such cases.
Plaintiff in Varnish alleged a violation of his right of pri-
vacy by an article published in The National Inquirer, a weekly
sensationalist newspaper run along much the same lines as the
detective magazines. The article told of the suicide of plain-
tiff's wife and her concurrent murder of their three children.
The article quoted portions of the wife's suicide note and in-
cluded comments from several neighbors and friends. The root
of plaintiff's claim was that the article made his wife appear
to be a model housewife, when in fact she was mentally disturbed
and had not enjoyed a happy home life. In brief, the court
found that Varnish's privacy had been violated by the article
and the publisher's reckless disregard of the truth.
78. Id. at 930.
79. 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 NXE2d 761 (1958).
80. Id. at 208-09, 149 NxE2d at 762 (emphasis by the court).
81. 405 F2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968).
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It was not so much the decision but rather the way in which
it was rendered which is important. The court stated that "a
proper balancing of the public interest in freedom of expression
and the individual interest in privacy" requires that in order to
sustain his cause of action in privacy the plaintiff must prove
both "intentional or reckless falsity and offensiveness to persons
of ordinary sensibilities."3 2 Judge Lumbard ruled out any re-
covery for privacy invasions caused by true stories if the above
statement is taken at face value. But at another point in the
opinion he said, "[iMinor inaccuracies and fictionalized dia-
logue alone will not defeat the privilege granted to truthful pub-
lications of public interest."813 Here he implied that no privilege
is given truthful publications which are not in the public in-
terest.
Judge Hays, who dissented in the 2-1 decision, thought the
proper standard to be applied was of the "limits of decency." He
added: "The news media must be allowed wide leeway in decid-
ing what they will report and how they will report it."81
But another federal court, the district court for the District
of Columbia, has also stated that absolute protection will be
given to truthful publications, in Clark v. Pearson.5 The
plaintiff was a former United States Congressman who charged
that an article by columnist Drew Pearson libelled him by al-
legations that he accepted payoffs. The Washington Post was
also named as a defendant. Although the suit was based in libel,
the court's statements on truth are unqualified. The court de-
clared, "[The law does not afford any protection against the
disclosure of truth, no matter how unpalatable or disagreeable
it may be; no matter how unnecessary its revelation; and no
matter what the motive or purpose of the disclosure may be."8 6
Taking the Varnish and Clark opinions at face value, there
is precious little protection left for the individual, whether he
be a public figure, or just an ordinary citizen. Courts on both
the state and federal levels have failed to come up with any con-
crete concepts defining the scope of privacy which is to be af-
forded the individual. Almost anything which happens is in the
public interest if that is taken to mean that some portion of the
public is interested in or entertained by an account of it.
82. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 612.
84. Id. at 613.
85. 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965).
86. Id. at 191.
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Several cases, though, set forth the principle that the individ-
ual has a right not to be needlessly embarrassed. The distinction
between public figures and others would be that certain stories
which would embarrass an ordinary person would be taken as a
matter of course by a public figure. For example, actress Sally
Kirkland, who has appeared nude in several recent New York
plys,87 would probably not have a cause of action if photo-
graphed with her skirt blown up by a gust of wind. Mrs.
Graham88 did have such a cause of action. Embarrassment is
not itself a clear standard, but it appears to be the only one which
courts are willing to accept.
VII.
The basic question which the publisher must answer or have
answered for him is simple. Prof. Harry Kalven, Jr. has stated
it thus: "[TV]hat less than every such unconsented-to reference
is prima facie tortious"?89 It is the answer which is complex.
Clearly, some distinction must be made between public figures
and others. Whether or not they desire or enjoy it, many per-
sons are necessarily going to be subject to continual publicity
throughout their lives. Some will have sought this publicity,
either directly or indirectly; for example, by becoming a candi-
date for public office a person is indirectly seeking publicity.
His primary objective may be election to that office, but public-
ity will accompany election - and many times will not end with
defeat. A flagpole sitter or motion picture actress frequently
seeks publicity directly.
For whatever reason, these public figures will be in the news.
Their activities will be constantly watched. In the case of public
officials, any deviation, no matter how slight, from accepted
norms of conduct will be a matter for fair comment. John Doe
may date whomever he wishes, but a prime minister may have to
go into seclusion if he chooses to spend his spare time with a
Christine Keeler-type companion.
There are distinct ethical and personal differences regarding
publicity in the positions of those who seek publicity itself and
those who have it thrust upon them. However, value judgments
87. "Sweet Eros", et al.
88. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
89. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 326 at 333 (1966) (emphasis by Prof. Kalven).
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in such an area are so subjective as to be useless. No legal dis-
tinctions should be drawn between the two types of public fig-
ures.
In determining who is a public figure the news media have
control. Since a public figure is one who has been brought into
the public view through his activities or occupation, the news
media can to a large extent control who is and is not a public
figure. If publicity is lavished upon someone he becomes, ipso
facto, a public figure. But the publicity and identity are act-
ually inseparable. The media have no practical reason to pub-
licize someone who is not noteworthy.
Many public figures have obtained fame on a nationwide or
even regional basis. But often reference will have to be made to
the local community in which an individual resides. The mayor
of Pontiac, Michigan, may not be a public figure nationally, but
he is locally, and therefore he is placed on an equal status with
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney.
It would be discriminatory to allow local newspapers to pub-
lish certain facts about the mayor, and to hold publishers in
other cities liable for the identical publication. The equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits such dif-
ferentiation.
Non-public figures should not be subjected to the same scru-
tiny and searching publicity as public figures. But certain de-
tails about anyone's life can be published if they are news-
worthy. The broad scope which courts have given newsworthi-
ness makes decisions in this area difficult, but it is safe to say
that individuals cannot be selected at random for intimate pub-
licity. This is not to say that causes of action arise whenever a
newspaper publishes a photograph of a crowd at a sports event,
but only that a newspaper has no right to pick a name from a
telephone directory and then proceed to publish a detailed, fact-
ual biography, including criminal record and past marriages, if
any.
Involvement in a single news event could conceivably transform
a private citizen into a public figure, aside from criminal activ-
ity; e.g., the soldiers and marines who raised the flag on Iwo
Jima during World War II. But the usual case would be that the
person would become a limited public figure, solely for the pur-
poses of reporting on the newsworthy event in which he was in-
volved. The victim of an auto accident will not become a public
[Vol. 2
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figure in general, but only in relation to the accident. He will,
however, be open to future comment regarding the accident.90
And involvement in a newsworthy event may give rise to pub-
licity about previous involvement in other such events. Witness
the case of Werner v. Times-Mirror Company,91 in which a
former city attorney brought suit against the Los Angeles news-
papers for an article recounting his rather checkered past. The
article was triggered by plaintiff's third marriage. The Cali-
fornia court quoted with approval a section from a similar case:
It is characteristic of every era, no less than of our con-
temporary world, that events which have caught the
popular imagination or incidents which have aroused the
public interest, have been frequently revivified long
after their occurrence in the literature, journalism, or
other media of communication of a later day. These
events, being embedded in the communal history, are
proper material for such recounting. It is well estab-
lished, therefore, that mere passage of time does not
preclude the publication of such incidents from the life
of one formerly in the public eye which are already
public property.92
After determining whether an individual is or is not a public
figure, the publisher must then decide if the event or events in
question are newsworthy. One commentator has made an in-
teresting observation on the use of the newsworthiness stand-
ard. If "newsworthy" is used simply as a descriptive term, then
it may have engulfed the tort of invasion of privacy. For exam-
ple, it will be difficult to prove that any item which has been
published was not interesting, and if it was not, then why
should the plaintiff be allowed to collect?
93
Prof. Kalven takes much the same attitude. He notes that
New York Times Co. v. Sulliva?9 4 may have given the news
privilege Constitutional protection, and if it has, he observes,
the privilege may have swallowed the tort. Kalven also observes
that the tort has proved to be a poor way to protect the individ-
ual's right of privacy, with those actually injured often unable
90. See Barbieri v. News Journal Co., supra note 33 and accompanying text.
91. 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961).
92. Id. at 118, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 212, quoting from Smith v. National Broad-
casting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807 at 814, 292 P.2d 600 at 604 (1956).
93. See Comment, supra note 36, at 725.
94. Supra, note 2.
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to bring suit because they are public figures, and the cases get-
ting to court being exceptionally trivial.9 5
It has been suggested that courts have not been able to decide
whether the term "newsworthy" merely indicates widespread
public interest, or if it incorporates a value judgment, referring
to the fact that a certain publication has merit and that the pub-
lic's interest is praiseworthy.98
In any case, the term is not easily defined. Certainly news
must embrace both the entertaining and informative - and some
people are bound to find anything put before their eyes enter-
taining. Since the scope of legitimate news cannot be narrowly
drawn, publishers will be forced to retreat to a consideration of
that hazy zone of privacy - freedom from unnecessary embar-
rassment - placed around individuals.
Newsworthiness, like the designation of public figures, cannot
be determined on other than objective standards. It would be
both impossible and unfair to begin weighing factors such as
the publication's own standards, its reading audience, and the
norms of the region in which it is distributed in order to arrive
at a determination of the newsworthiness of an individual art-
icle. Publications differ widely. They run the gamut from the
stodgy to the sensational, from The New York Times and THE
NE.W REPUnLic to R GUr and ILLUSTRATED DETECTr. It would
be constitutionally impermissible to hold the Times liable for
publishing material which ILLUSTrTED DrEcTiv could publish
with impunity.
The standard of newsworthiness which of necessity must be
used is therefore a rather base one, a lowest common denomina-
tor. News is both information and entertainment, and substan-
tial numbers of persons are entertained by material many others
would find disgusting.
At least one writer has suggested that different standards be
used by courts in determining newsworthiness. He set forth a
number of relevant factors:
As the size of the community in which the incident
occurs increases, the less newsworthy the name but the
less harmful the publication because fewer of the per-
sons who read the story are likely to know the partic-
ular plaintiff, and here gossip and rumor are not signi-
ficant considerations. Even here a neighborhood paper
95. See Kalven, supra note 89.
96. See Comment, .supra note 36, at 725.
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might be treated differently from a statewide organ.
These considerations of community size and media
coverage are unwieldy analytic devices and the results
of their use will be difficult to predict.... The nature
of the individual item and its intrinsic importance,
rather than its classification as a public record, should
perhaps be controlling.
97
The use of such considerations might seem valuable, especi-
ally in an area such as privacy, which is bound up with the in-
dividual and his personal freedoms. But the principle of equal
protection of the laws has become an integral part of our sys-
tem, and the utilization of such factors does not make for equal
protection.
The clash of values here is not an unequal one - the society's
right to know opposed to the individual's right to privacy - but
rather a conflict between society's interest in the widest possi-
ble dissemination of the news and society's interest in protecting
the privacy of all individuals.98
The Supreme Court is steadily moving towards a broader ap-
plication of the first amendment rights to the news media.99
The Court may eventually reach agreement on the position taken
by Mr. Justice Black - that the words of the first amendment,
"... make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . .," mean precisely what they say: no law.100
In the end, the individual's right of privacy may be unpro-
tected by the courts. He will have to look to the publishers and
rely on their self-restraint and self-regulation. Most courts
agree that there is a right of privacy, but few agree on what it
is. The only principle on which the courts have been able to
reach some semblance of agreement is that the individual has a
right to be free from unnewsworthy embarrassment in the
media.
Courts have not yet been forced to wrestle with the fact that
the plain, unsensationalized truth, the facts of someone's activi-
ties, can be damaging to that individual in a very real way. If
industry self-regulation is to be the solution, the courts will have
abdicated their responsibility.
97. Franklin, supra note 61, at 119-121.
98. See Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A
National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. R1v. 630 (1968).
99. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
and Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra notes 2, 14.
100. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 at 398 (1967) (concurring opinion).
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